I explore the conceptual foundations of Alan Turing's analysis of computability, which still dominates thinking about computability today. I argue that Turing's account represents a last vestige of a famous but unsuccessful program in pure mathematics, viz., Hilbert's formalist program. It is my contention that the plausibility of Turing's account as an analysis of the computational capacities of physical machines rests upon a number of highly problematic assumptions whose plausibility in turn is grounded in the formalist stance towards mathematics. More speciÿcally, the Turing account con ates concepts that are crucial for understanding the computational capacities of physical machines. These concepts include the idea of an "operation" or "action" that is "formal," "mechanical," "well-deÿned," and "precisely described," and the idea of a "symbol" that is "formal," "uninterpreted," and "shaped". When these concepts are disentangled, the intuitive appeal of Turing's account is signiÿcantly undermined. This opens the way for exploring models of hypercomputability that are fundamentally di erent from those currently entertained in the literature.
Introduction
Alan Turing's analysis still dominates thought about the nature of computability and the capacities of physical computing machines. 1 This is somewhat ironic because Turing explicitly designed it to solve a problem arising out of an unsuccessful early 20th century program in the foundations of pure mathematics. The program, known as formalism, originated with the work of David Hilbert. Hilbert was responding to the discovery of paradoxes in Georg Cantor's remarkably fruitful new set theory. In this paper I trace the development of the formalist school of thought in mathematics and analyze its impact on current conceptions of computability. I argue that the plausibility of Turing's account as an analysis of the computational capacities of physical machines rests upon a number of highly problematic tacit assumptions. When these concepts are disentangled, the intuitive appeal of Turing's account (as providing an analysis of the general concept of computability) is signiÿcantly undermined. I conclude with a discussion of the consequences of my ÿndings for the possibilities for hypercomputation (computation beyond the so-called "Turing limit").
Paradise lost
The discovery of paradoxes (e.g., Bertrand Russell's set of all sets that are not members of themselves) in Cantor's wonderful new set theory plunged mathematics into crisis; for a more extensive discussion of the history, see [12, 15] . Designed to clarify the foundations of mathematical analysis, Cantor's set theory sanctioned the full strength of the controversial real number system with its mysterious irrational numbers. His predecessors had found irrational numbers problematic because they seem to involve actual inÿnities, e.g., Leibniz's inÿnitesimals. The actually inÿnite transcends all possible experience. It is perceptually indistinguishable from the unending and the indeÿnitely large or small. Indeed, before Cantor, most mathematicians doubted the intelligibility (let alone the existence) of the concept of actual inÿnity. Limit processes were introduced by Weierstrass to circumvent the actual inÿnite by systematizing a notion of the merely potentially inÿnite, potential inÿnity being characterized as an incomplete entity that is indeÿnitely increasable or decreasable. Irrational numbers were deÿned (by Weierstrass and follow travelers) in terms of the limits of sequences or series of rational numbers. By the late 18th century, however, it was clear that limit processes could not keep the actual inÿnite at bay; understanding the irrational numbers required a coherent concept of completed inÿnities. Cantor cut the Gordian knot (so-tospeak) by developing a revolutionary set theory that explicitly introduced hierarchies of completed inÿnite sets into mathematics. Classical arithmetic, with its problematic irrationals, was reconstructed in terms of these hierarchies. The importance of Cantor's work to mathematics cannot be overstated. Without analysis much of modern mathematics (including the calculus, geometry, abstract algebra, and most of applied mathematics) would disappear. The discovery of paradoxes in Cantor's set theoretic paradise was thus a serious blow to mathematicians.
David Hilbert hoped to save Cantor's set theory from the ravages of the paradoxes by radically reconceptualizing mathematics. 2 Mathematics is not the study of abstract 2 Hilbert was the originator of formalism but there is signiÿcant disagreement about his actual views. It is generally conceded that his version of formalism is weaker than the position now associated with formalism. Indeed, he has been criticized for his fence-straddling realism about mathematics; he identiÿed the content of mathematics with physical marks and their manipulations. My concern in this paper, however, is not with the history of Hilbert's ideas so much as the contemporary understanding of the formalist position. For a detail discussion of Hilbert's early views and their relation to those of later formalists, see [12, 15] .
entities (e.g., the number 2) and their interrelations (e.g., less than). Mathematics is the study of formal systems. The terms and operations of formal systems consist of ÿnite numbers of primitive symbols (marks or "strokes") and ÿnite numbers of "purely mechanical" operations on these symbols. Considered as part of a formal system, the symbols are meaningless. They may stand for anything whatsoever or nothing at all. All that matters is their structure-their proverbial "shape". Any structural feature may play the role of symbol so long as di erent primitive symbols are represented by distinct structures. The operations of a formal system are sensitive only to the structure (vs. meaning) of a symbol. Their purpose is to construct strings of symbols (formulae) and to transform them into other strings of symbols in a step-by-step fashion (i.e., to construct proofs).
Hilbert's plan was to formalize enough of classical arithmetic for doing analysis while avoiding the paradoxes. To accomplish this he needed the right kind of formalism, namely, a formalism whose formal consistency corresponds to the logical consistency of the relevant portion of classical arithmetic. The basic idea was to start with an axiomatization of classical arithmetic (of which a number were already available, including Whitehead and Russell's, in Principia Mathematica), and then formalize it. In the process of formalization, the traditional content of mathematics is stripped away. The features that remain are purely formal. The task of the formalist was to show that the resultant formalism provides a consistent and complete formal theory of classical arithmetic. Proofs of consistency and completeness could not, however, employ methods resting upon suspect transÿnite ideas; this would defeat the whole purpose of the formalist program. The powerful existence proofs of classical mathematics were thus unavailable. As a consequence, one of the central problems facing the formalist was that of ÿnding a deÿnite ÿnitary formal procedure that could be used to unequivocally decide the provability of any claim in formalized mathematics. This decision problem became known as Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem.
3
The similarity between Turing's account of computability and the formalist account of mathematics is obvious. The symbols of Turing machines are "uninterpreted" (meaningless) structures that are manipulated solely on the basis of their "shapes". Indeed, despite the popular conception of Turing machines as ultimately simple, abstract mechanisms, mathematicians and theoretical computer scientists analyze Turing machines as formal mathematical structures. This is hardly an accident. Turing did not invent his "machines" to provide an analysis of the computational capacities of physical machines. He designed them to solve the Entscheidungsproblem, a problem speciÿc to the formalist program in the foundations of pure mathematics. Not all programs in the foundations of mathematics would ÿnd a formalist proof convincing. Indeed, the two other major schools of thought, intuitionism and Platonism, reject the idea that everything important to classical arithmetic can be captured in a formalization; for more on this, see [12] . Something meaningful and unformalizable that renders arithmetic logically (vs. merely formally) inconsistent or consistent could have been left out of the formalism. The point is Turing's account of computability is founded upon an idiosyncratic philosophical view about the nature of mathematics.
Nevertheless, it did not take long for Turing's analysis to be extended to the computational capacities of physical machines, a position which (as the title of Martin Davis's recent book, Engines of Logic, illustrates) still dominates in the ÿelds of computer science and mathematics. If the formalist program had been successful this would make good theoretical sense. Classical arithmetic would have been fully captured in a formal system. As a consequence, the formal possibilities for computing functions would have exhausted all the possibilities, setting an absolute logical limit on what functions are computable. But as is well known, Kurt G odel e ectively demolished the formalist program with the discovery of his famous incompleteness theorems. In a nutshell, G odel proved that a formal system rich enough to encapsulate elementary arithmetic (let alone classical arithmetic) could not be both consistent and complete; if arithmetic is consistent, arithmetical truth goes beyond what can be proven in any (recursively axiomatisable) formal system. This means that formalism cannot provide us with a satisfactory account of the nature of arithmetic.
In light of the failure of the formalist program, the claim that Turing machines capture the computable functions is highly suspect, ultimately resting upon non-mathematical suppositions about the nature of computation and physical processes. Turing embraced a highly anthropomorphic view of computation. He unselfconsciously introduced his "machines" in the context of a person plugging away at arithmetical calculations with pencil and paper [18, p. 135] . Given that physical devices can do many things (e.g., escape the pull of Earth's gravitational ÿeld, withstand tremendous pressures at great ocean depths) that cannot be done by unaided human beings, why would any one be convinced that human beings provide a good model for the computational capacities of physical machines? Furthermore, it is clear that the capacities of nature are not just a matter of having the right formal structure. Build the walls of a deep sea submersible out of the wrong material and it will quickly implode. It is not enough for defenders of the Turing view to retort that Turing machines represent idealized human beings, and thus are not subject to human frailties. For this merely side steps the central question, which is why model computability on the capacities of limited creatures like human beings in the ÿrst place! Besides, there are many di erent ways in which one could idealize the computational activity of human beings. Turing opted for setting no upper bound on the number of actions his "machines" could perform; he allowed them unlimited space and time in which to operate. But he could have idealized human action in other ways. He could have set no upper bound on the speed with which they perform their actions, for instance. What justiÿes selecting one idealization of human action over another? An obvious retort is that there is an upper limit to the speed of physical processes in our universe. Einstein's theory of relativity tells us that no real-valued mass can travel faster than light. But this is an empirical consideration. Why not invoke empirical considerations in the case of space and time too? Entropy, for example, sets limits to the capacities of physical objects to perform actions. No physical device can go on and on, performing actions forever. What justiÿcation can there be for preferring one empirically unrealistic idealization of human action to another? Just because humans who are consciously performing calculations do it in a stepby-step (sequential and discrete) fashion, does not mean that all calculation must be done in this manner, i.e., must actually be constituted by a sequence of discrete primitive sub calculations. Insofar as functions are identiÿed with sets of ordered pairs, it seems that any process that achieves the requisite pairings ought to count as a computation. Why take human computational behavior as the paradigm for all computational processes?
The familiar retort to those who raise such concerns is that Turing's account says nothing about how physical processes actually compute functions. It merely says that (however they do it) no physical processes can compute something that a Turing machine could not compute. But given the failure of the formalist program in mathematics, what could motivate such a claim? Again, there is a familiar response. Turing's analysis initially faced two competitors, Herbrand-G odel general recursiveness and Church's lambda-calculus. Turing demonstrated that all three accounts are extensionally equivalent vis-Ã a-vis the computation of the number-theoretic functions. There is thus strong inductive support for the claim that mathematicians have captured the decidable (a.k.a. computable) number-theoretic functions. But this response ignores the fact that all three accounts are grounded in the formalist perspective on mathematics. Indeed, each proposal was explicitly designed to solve Hilbert's Entscheidungsproblem. Viewed in this light, it is not so surprising that they end up classifying the same functions as computable; they are built on the same conceptual bedrock. Finally, the oft-repeated allegation that no one has been able to come up with a function that cannot be computed by a Turing machine but can nonetheless be computed by some other means provides little support for the o cial Turing view. For it studiously ignores the growing body of literature on inductive machines (e.g., Burgin [1] , Gold [11] and Putnam [13] ), analogue chaotic neural nets (e.g., Siegelmann [16] ), and accelerating (Zeus) machines (e.g., Copeland [7] and Steinhart [17] ) claiming to have done just this! Defenders of the received view on computability ignore this literature because they are not willing to countenance an activity that fails to conform to the strictures of the o cial Turing line as a computation. There is more than a whi of circularity here.
It is high time that the conceptual foundations of the o cial Turing account be laid bare and subject to critical scrutiny. For we cannot reach an informed decision about its relevance to the capacities of physical machines unless we understand the assumptions upon which it rests. The remainder of this paper is devoted to this task. It reviews work that has been presented elsewhere (Cleland [2] [3] [4] [5] ). I argue that the plausibility of the received view of computability rests upon some highly problematic concepts, more speciÿcally, the idea of an "operation" or "action" that is "formal," "mechanical," "well-deÿned," and "precisely described," and the idea of a "symbol" that is "formal," "uninterpreted," and "shaped". These concepts play pivotal roles in motivating the claim that Turing's account captures the general intuitive concept of computability. Turing machines are typically characterized as providing paradigms of deÿnite methods in virtue of (1) the "precision" with which their instructions specify the actions that they prescribe and (2) the "purely mechanical" nature of those actions. But as I show, a close look at these claims reveals that Turing machines cannot live up to their vaunted reputation of providing perfectly precise speciÿcations of action and the claim that Turing machine operations are "purely mechanical" confuses di erent meanings of the word "mechanical". Similarly, the source of the great generality of Turing machines is reputed to lie in the "purely formal" character of their symbols and operations. But the level of generality is too high. One cannot get bona ÿde actions out of purely formal symbols and operations. I conclude by defending the radical claim that Turing machines do not provide us with genuine procedures. They provide us with mere procedure schemas. When these schemas are ÿlled in with genuine action, we get authentic procedures. As I argue in the ÿnal sections, understanding the capacities of physical machines to compute functions requires more than a theory of procedural schemas. It requires a theory of authentic procedures, something that the o cial Turing account (lashed tightly to the conceptual framework of the formalist account of mathematics) is intrinsically incapable of providing.
The received view on computability
We begin our discussion with a brief review of the structure and function of the peculiar objects at the heart of the received view on computability, namely, Turing machines. I shall restrict my discussion to the simplest Turing machines, namely, the deterministic, sequential "machines" of introductory textbooks; everything that I say applies fairly straightforwardly to the more complex non-deterministic and multidimensional Turing machines. 4 Turing machines are characterized in the literature in two quite di erent ways, namely, as abstract mechanisms and as mathematical structures. The former characterization is much more machine-like than the latter. A Turing machine is described as consisting of a "mechanism," known as a "ÿnite state machine," coupled to an external storage medium, known as the "tape," through an abstract device known as the "head." In the standard scenario, each square of the tape is occupied by one of two di erent symbols (S 0 and S 1 ), and the head, which is always positioned over a square of the tape, performs one of a small set of extremely simple basic operations; the head can "erase" or "write" a symbol, "move" to the left one square, or "halt." What the head does to the tape is determined by the instruction that it is currently carrying out. Turing machines compute arithmetical functions by implementing lists of conditional instructions called "programs." The arguments and values of the function are "coded" on the tape as strings of S 0 s and S 1 s.
The use of common English imperatives, such as "write" and "move," to describe the basic operations of Turing machines underscores their anthropomorphic character. Turing machines do the sorts of things that human beings do when consciously performing calculations with pencil and paper. But, as I have argued [4, 5] , the idea that a Turing machine can perform an action (however broadly or abstractly construed) is fundamentally mistaken.
Action requires something to manipulate; if nothing is manipulated no action is performed. The entities reputedly manipulated ("written" and "erased") by Turing machines are symbols. In keeping with the formalist stance on mathematics, Turing machine symbols are purely formal entities. Their meaning plays no role in what is done to them. They are manipulated solely on the basis of their proverbial shapes. It follows that the shapes of Turing machine symbols are crucial to the identity of the actions prescribed by Turing machines.
Unfortunately, however, the idea that Turing machine symbols have distinguishing shapes is fraught with di culties. One might try identifying the shape of a Turing machine symbol with some geometrical feature that all of its instances have in common. But the very same symbol may be instantiated by objects having incommensurable shapes, e.g., numerals, pen strokes, pebbles on squares of toilet paper, and nails in tin cans. Moreover, non-geometrical characteristics such as weights, colors, durations of a sound, or intensities of light may also be used to instantiate Turing machine symbols. The problem is that the di ering symbols of a Turing machine may be instantiated by any deÿnite but distinct physical entities. The only physical constraints on the symbols of a Turing machine hold within (vs. across) its physical realizations. Within a particular realization, every token of the same symbol must share some (it does not matter what) physical property and all tokens of di erent symbols must di er in some (it does not matter what) physical property. Considered independently of a particular realization, however, the most that may be said is that di erent symbols have di erent but not any deÿnite distinguishing physical properties. The idea of a mere di erence in some completely indeterminate physical property is not enough to secure the idea that Turing machine symbols have distinguishing shapes.
As one might expect, the situation only gets worse on the formal mathematical view of Turing machines. Turing machines are identiÿed with mathematical structures, which consist of functions and relations (both of which are identiÿed with sets of n-tuples, ordered in the case of the former) and constants. The "usual" (prototypical) structure for a Turing machine includes three binary functions (the "next place" function, the "next symbol" function, and the "next state" function), and two symbols. 5 The symbols are typically represented as "0" and "1," which suggests that they are numerals. But numerals have deÿnite geometrical shapes. If they are numerals, it makes no sense to talk about instantiating the same Turing machine in a physical system whose symbols consist of pebbles or ashes of light, for instance. That is to say, identifying "0" and "1" as numerals amounts to con ating a speciÿc abstract mathematical structure (the usual structure for a Turing machine) with one of its concrete instantiations. On the other hand, if they are not numerals, what can they be? Integers? Integers (qua abstract mathematical objects) have no physical features whatsoever. If they are integers we lose even the minimalist idea that distinct Turing machine symbols must di er in at least some physical property. We are left with a relation of bare numerical di erence among symbols. Bare numerical di erence is incompatible with the idea that uninstantiated Turing machine symbols have distinguishing "shapes," however broadly or indeÿnitely construed. To appreciate this, one need only entertain the theoretical possibility of authentic twins, e.g., two leaves or snow akes that are literally identical. Although numerically distinct, such objects would be exactly alike in all their physical characteristics.
This brings us to what is perhaps the most problematic aspect of the idea that Turing machine symbols have distinguishing "shapes." In mathematics, Turing machines are identiÿed only up to isomorphism; they are not actually identiÿed with their usual structures. More speciÿcally, on the formal mathematical account, a Turing machine is a class of isomorphic structures (abstract and concrete), one of which (the usual structure) happens to be picked out as representative of the class as a whole. From a logical point of view, a class of Turing machine instantiations is no more a Turing machine than the class of all red objects is a red object. In other words, considered independently of a particular instantiation, the symbols of a "Turing machine" amount to nothing more than logical roles in a second order structure that (strictly speaking) is not a Turing machine. Rather than being symbols of some extraordinarily abstract and reÿned sort, Turing machine "symbols" are just placeholders for symbols. It is not until we descend to the level of the individual structures in the equivalence class deÿning a Turing machine, that we get authentic symbols. It follows that we can not be said to have speciÿcations of action, however imprecise, at the level of a Turing machine considered independently of any of its instantiations.
Even supposing that Turing machine "symbols" were the real McCoy, however, we still could not get precise speciÿcations of action out of Turing machine instructions. Although action presupposes something to manipulate, having something to manipulate is not su cient to pick out an action. Specifying a knife and a carrot in a recipe, for example, does not ÿx what is to be done to the carrot by the knife. The possibilities are wide open. They include dicing it, slicing it, shaving it, stabbing it, stroking it with the blade, and pounding it with the handle, to mention just a few. In other words, despite the use of familiar English expressions for action, Turing machine instructions do not specify what is to be done once their symbol-placeholders are ÿlled by genuine symbols. "Erasing" a pebble could be realized by activities as diverse as painting it, pulverizing it, ipping it over, or removing it from a tin can.
One of the great virtues of Turing's account is supposedly the "purely mechanical" character of Turing machine operations. As earlier, the use of this expression is misleading. When physical scientists speak of mechanical actions they have in mind the proverbial pushes and pulls of Newtonian mechanics. The instructions of Turing machines are not limited to actions of this sort, however. They may be satisÿed by activities as diverse as action-at-a-distance (which requires no intervening causal chain) and angels creating and annihilating pebbles. It does not matter whether action-at-adistance or angels really exist. All that matters for our purposes is that they violate no laws of logic and could be used to instantiate a Turing machine. This underscores a crucial point. In keeping with the formalist framework for mathematics, the constraints imposed upon Turing machine "actions" are purely structural: They must be distinct from one another (discrete) and they must occur in a time-ordered sequence.
These are exceedingly minimal requirements. The physical scientist's notion of mechanical encompasses much more. In order to qualify as mechanical, an activity must have the right kind of intrinsic causal character. The upshot is that Turing machine actions cannot be said to be "mechanical" in anything like the physical scientist's sense.
It is possible, of course, that Turing and his defenders had some other notion of mechanical in mind. Indeed, Turing sometimes used the word "automatic" in place of "mechanical" [18, p. 118] and his student Robin Gandy [10, p. 80] spoke of Turing machines performing actions without "thought or volition." Unfortunately this use of "mechanical" does not capture the idea of a ÿnite constructive process, a crucial ingredient in any notion of mechanism (Newtonian or otherwise). As an illustration, one can coherently speak of bored angels "automatically" performing ba ing miracles. In short, the terminology may be suggestive but one should not be fooled by it into thinking that Turing machines are mechanisms in anything like the sense in which a physical machine is said to be a "mechanism". There is even some question as to whether Turing had in mind physical machines when he used expressions like "mechanical" and "mechanism." According to Gandy [10] , Turing's target was human calculability and he never intended his analysis to apply to physical machines. Gandy attempted to extend Turing's analysis to physical machines in light of very general considerations from contemporary physical theory [9, 10] . Oron Shagrir argues [14] , however, that Gandy's account does not encompass all instances of ÿnite machine computation, suggesting perhaps that Turing's analysis cannot be extended to physical computation after all.
As is hardly surprising, the formal mathematical account does not o er us any help in making sense of the idea that Turing machine instructions prescribe genuine actions. The basic Turing machine operations ("erase," "write," "move") are deÿned in terms of ordered n-tuples (mathematical functions). Ordered n-tuples do not require change (let alone change that qualiÿes as action) for their realization. Thus the structures in the equivalence class deÿning a Turing machine need not be dynamic, let alone mechanical. 6 They may be instantiated by spatially ordered structures such as mineral crystals. In moving from the informal to the formal account, we have lost the most essential feature of action, namely, dynamic change.
Let us pull this all together. The instructions of Turing machines (considered as uninstantiated, multiply realizable abstract entities) do not prescribe actions of any sort. If they do not prescribe actions, they can hardly be said to precisely describe them. The vaunted precision of Turing machine instructions thus turns out to be a myth. This has serious consequences for the received view on computability. At the heart of the received view is the notion of an e ective procedure: Turing machines are said to be paragons of e ective procedure. For a procedure to be e ective, the actions it prescribes must be precisely speciÿed (i.e., "precisely described" or "well deÿned"). So if Turing machine programs do not precisely specify actions, they cannot be said to supply us with e ective procedures. Indeed, because they do not prescribe actions of any sort, they cannot even be said to supply us with authentic procedures. At best, Turing machines may be said to provide procedure schemas, i.e., time-ordered, skeletal frameworks for procedures. To get authentic procedures, these frameworks must be ÿlled in with speciÿcations of action.
Causation, e ective procedures, and physical computability
Understanding the computational capacities of physical machines requires a theory of authentic (vs. schematic) procedures. We need to understand the general conditions under which an authentic procedure is e ective, i.e., reliably produces a certain result (e.g., the decimal expansion of ) when correctly followed. The best examples of authentic procedures do not come from mathematics, however, but from ordinary, everyday life. A recipe for a cake and instructions for assembling a child's tricycle provide salient examples. In previous work [4, 5] , I dubbed such procedures "quotidian" in order to distinguish them from the schemas provided by Turing machine theory.
Unlike Turing machines, it is clear that quotidian procedures prescribe bona ÿde actions, e.g., whip the egg yolks until they form a yellow ribbon and bolt the handlebars to the frame. Admittedly, they do not provide perfectly precise speciÿcations of action. But as I have argued [4, 5] , the perfect precision of Turing machine instructions is a myth. Turing machines are literally deÿned as machines that do exactly what their instructions tell them to do. It is thus not logically possible for a Turing machine to execute an instruction to "write" an S 0 and yet fail to "place" an S 0 on the tape. In contrast, failure is always a very real possibility for a follower of a quotidian procedure. No instruction prescribing an authentic action can preclude the possibility of being misunderstood or misapplied. The success of human beings in following imprecisely described instructions is a product of training coupled with a shared repertoire of basic bodily actions such as moving a ÿnger or rotating a wrist. 7 From an intuitive standpoint, many quotidian procedures are e ective in the sense that they reliably produce speciÿc outcomes when correctly followed. Unlike Turing machine procedures, however, the reliability of a quotidian procedure does not depend just upon the identity (and time-order) of the actions it prescribes (however imprecisely). It also depends upon the causal consequences of performing the actions. Nevertheless, these consequences are not themselves speciÿed by the procedure; the procedure speciÿes only the actions that produce them. To appreciate this, consider a 7 Basic bodily actions are speciÿed in terms of their direct e ects on the body, namely, basic bodily motions. The instruction to move one's ÿnger, for example, does not describe how to do it; it presupposes that you already know how to move your ÿnger. No instruction can tell one how to perform a basic bodily actions-either you are physiologically intact and know how to do it, or you can not do it because of some disability or restraint. Anyone who knows how to perform basic bodily actions can be trained to apply instructions prescribing them, and hence to follow procedures specifying complex spatio-temporal arrangements of basic bodily actions. Children learn to follow such procedures, and as they become increasingly sophisticated, they can follow procedures (e.g., a recipe for Hollandaise sauce) prescribing complex spatio-temporal arrangements of intricate actions. recipe for Hollandaise sauce. One is instructed to pour melted butter by droplets into warm egg yolks while continuously beating them with a wire whisk. What produces the Hollandaise sauce, however, is not the mere performance of these actions but the physical processes that they generate and sustain. If performing these actions reliably caused egg yolks to become granular and oat in butter (instead of causing them to absorb butter and hold it in creamy suspension) the recipe would not be reliable for making Hollandaise sauce. But although they are crucial to the e ectiveness of the recipe, the causal consequences of these actions are not themselves speciÿed by the recipe. To see this, imagine a possible world, W 1 , in which the laws of chemistry di er from those in the actual world, W a , in such a way that whisking droplets of butter into warm egg yolks causes them to turn into a smooth elastic mass. 8 Now suppose that someone in W 1 correctly follows the recipe for Hollandaise sauce. The result is nothing like a Hollandaise sauce, and this di erence in outcome does not correspond to a di erence in recipe. In both worlds, people follow the same instructions, performing the same (types of) actions in the same order in time. But they get di erent results. Performing the same actions (in the same order in time and space) causes very di erent things to happen in W a and W 1 . In other words, the same recipe may be e ective in one world and ine ective in another world for a given outcome. The e ectiveness of the recipe for a given outcome depends upon the causal character of the world in which it is followed. The identity of the recipe qua procedure does not. This is in stark contrast to Turing machines, whose "outcomes" are completely determined in advance by their instruction sets (and their initial conÿgurations). The appearance of an S 0 on a Turing machine's tape does not result in any further changes to the tape until another instruction, containing an S 0 in its antecedent, is implemented. This is not to deny that if the S 0 were interpreted as the integer 1 it would have arithmetical consequences. But in this scenario one is no longer dealing with a Turing machine simpliciter. One is dealing with one of its interpretations. Assigning di erent integers to S 0 yields di erent interpretations, with correspondingly di erent arithmetical consequences. Thus the same Turing machines can compute di erent arithmetical functions. Similarly, if one encodes the S 0 by placing a stone in a cup of water, there will be causal consequences such as a rise in the level of the water. But, again, one is not dealing with a Turing machine simpliciter. One is dealing with one of its instantiations. Considered just in itself-independently of any of its instantiations or interpretationsthe sequence of "actions" speciÿed by a Turing machine is the only process that the machine engages in. Put another way, unlike the case with quotidian procedures, there is no distinction between the sequence of actions performed by the machine and the process that generates the result with respect to which it is said to be reliable (a.k.a. e ective). Viewed in this light, it is easy to see why everything that a Turing machine "does" is characterized as completely determined in advance by the procedure (given the initial conÿguration of the machine), and hence why the e ectiveness of a Turing machine procedure for a particular outcome is absolute, i.e., does not change from one possible world to the next. It is also easy to see why every Turing machine is characterized as qualifying as an e ective procedure. But of course these characterizations of Turing machines are misleading. They presuppose that Turing machines provide us with bona ÿde procedures. As we have seen, they do not.
Their dependence upon the causal character of the world in which they are implemented is the source of the great power of quotidian procedures. The actions speciÿed by quotidian procedures represent adroit causal interventions in the course of nature, interventions which give rise to things that nature would rarely (if ever) produce on her own. We owe most of the comforts of civilization to the design of quotidian procedures for forcing nature along improbable causal pathways. The limits to what can be achieved by means of quotidian procedures are set by the causal possibilities for intervening in physical processes. These are not the same from one possible world to another. In order to support quotidian procedures, a world must have localized causal openings. Localized causal openings are nature's ready-made switches. They are local physical factors that may be modiÿed independently of other physical factors with reliable causal consequences. A quotidian procedure may thus be viewed as a temporally and spatially organized arrangement of selective causal interventions. These manipulations of nature serve to redirect and reshape natural processes into the improbable outcomes with respect to which the procedure is reliable.
But as I have argued [5] , what happens as a result of these highly selective interventions is not speciÿed by the procedure. There is a causal gap between the actions speciÿed by a quotidian procedure and the physical processes that make it reliable. One might suspect that this gap is a disadvantage since, unlike the case with Turing machines, it means that the reliability of the procedure can not be attributed to the procedure per se. Indeed, it explains why the reliability of some familiar quotidian procedures (e.g., recipes) varies under di erent physical circumstances (altitude) within the same world. But further re ection reveals that the gap between action and process is actually a perk. Because of it, one can make a great Hollandaise sauce without knowing any chemistry. One need only know how to perform the actions speciÿed by the recipe. Nature takes care of the rest. It also means that people can invent procedures for getting things done without knowing very much about the physical and chemical processes involved. The chef who invented Hollandaise sauce almost certainly knew little chemical theory but this did not prevent him or her from ÿnding a reliable method for creating a delectable sauce. In other words, quotidian procedures insulate us from the messy causal details of the world while at the same time allowing us to e ectively intervene in those details so as to reliably produce advantageous outcomes.
With an understanding of quotidian procedures ÿrmly in hand, we can make better sense of the schematic character of Turing machines. As we have seen, quotidian procedures represent systematic ways of causally intervening in the world. In contrast, Turing machines (with their placeholders for action) are best viewed as logical possibilities for systematic causal intervention. This explains why their reputed e ectiveness does not vary from one possible world to another, namely, every possible world contains at least the bare logical possibility of reliable procedures. In this context, it is important to keep in mind the anthropomorphic character of Turing machines; indeed, as discussed earlier, they provide us with a special idealization of human (procedurefollowing) behavior. For this reason, they cannot be construed as exhausting all the logical possibilities for procedure.
Whether a logical possibility for procedure is physically realizable, however, depends upon the causal character of the world in which it is implemented. Worlds lacking dependable localized causal openings will not support reliable quotidian procedures. Moreover, physical processes within the same world may vary greatly in the frequency and accessibility of their causal openings. Exploiting a causal opening may require physical circumstances that are very di cult to bring about. Some physical processes will thus be easier to harness by means of procedures than others. All other things being equal, those worlds whose physical processes contain the largest number of easily accessible, localized causal openings will support the richest technologies.
Our discussion underscores an important point. In keeping with the formalist account of mathematics, Turing's analysis treats e ectiveness as a purely formal property of procedures. But as we have seen, it is not. Turing machine programs cannot be said to be e ective because they are not authentic procedures; they are mere schemas for procedure. Quotidian procedures, on the other hand, are genuine procedures. But their reliability for a given outcome does not depend upon their formal (schematic) properties. It depends upon a complex causal relation standing between the actions they prescribe and suitable causal openings in the right kinds of physical process.
Hypercomputation
What are the implications of these ÿndings for the computational capacities of physical machines? There is little reason to suppose that Turing machines tell us much about the capacities of physical machines to achieve reliable outcomes, and this includes computing arithmetical functions as well as fabricating things like synthetic ÿbers and wonder drugs. The key to computing an arithmetical function is ÿnding a physical process that can be harnessed by a procedure in such a way as to produce something that may be interpreted as pairing the right numbers, viz., the arguments and values of the function. Mere logical possibilities for arranging completely indeterminate actions in prearranged orders in time cannot shed light upon what functions are computable any more than they can shed light upon the possibilities for synthesizing synthetic fabrics. For in both cases, it is the e ects of performing authentic actions that ultimately produce the outcomes of interest, and these causal consequences lie outside the scope of the speciÿcations of a Turing machine.
Nevertheless most models of hypercomputation are closely wedded to the Turing model. All of the models mentioned earlier (viz., inductive machines, analogue chaotic neural nets, and accelerating machines) closely resemble traditional Turing machines. Indeed, they di er from them only insofar as they lift various restrictions on their structure. In other words, most models of hypercomputation presuppose that the key to computation beyond the so-called Turing limit is to be found in the structural features of procedures.
Accelerating machines [7, 8] provide a salient example. Traditional Turing machines idealize human computational abilities to unlimited space and time. Accelerating machines add yet another layer of idealization, permitting traditional Turing machines to work indeÿnitely fast. By performing each Turing machine operation in a fraction (e.g., half) of the time that it takes to perform its predecessor, an accelerating machine can complete an inÿnite number of steps in a ÿnite amount of time, thus computing functions (e.g., the halting function [7] ) that the universal Turing machine cannot compute. The important point for our discussion, however, is that, except for their ability to work faster and faster, accelerating machines are just like traditional Turing machines. As a consequence, they can not be said to prescribe authentic actions any more than traditional Turing machines can be said to prescribe authentic actions; they specify only that completely indeÿnite "actions" be performed at faster and faster rates. The same point holds for inductive machines and analogue chaotic neural nets, which also achieve hypercomputation by eliminating restrictions on the structure of traditional Turing machines. In the case of inductive machines, the requirement that a Turing machine produce a result only when it halts is eliminated [1, 11, 13] . Analogue chaotic neural nets [16] , on the other hand, eliminate the requirement that the input and output of a Turing machine be strictly ÿnite. The most that may be said about inductive machines and analogue chaotic neural nets is that, like accelerating machines, they provide us with new varieties of procedural schema.
In order to get a physical device to realize these alternative procedural schemas, however, they must be ÿlled in with authentic actions, and this brings us to a problem. Given our current understanding of physics, these schemas cannot be realized. Although one can readily imagine worlds in which, for example, a physical device behaves like an accelerating machine and performs an inÿnite number of structurally distinct actions in a ÿnite amount of time, to the best of our knowledge, our world is not among them. But it does not follow from this that our world can not support hypercomputational physical devices. For as I have argued, procedural schemas are not the place to search for physically powerful models of hypercomputation. What we really need to look for are physical processes that can be causally harnessed by selective physical interventions (authentic actions) in such a way as to produce physical e ects that may be interpreted as Turing uncomputable real numbers. 9 There is no reason to suppose that achieving such outcomes requires physical machines that perform distinct actions at speeds well in excess of that of light-indeed, at speeds approaching inÿnity as a limit! Investigation of the purely structural features of procedures cannot, however, be expected to reveal how physical processes could be reshaped by selective causal interventions to yield an outcome of the right sort. Jack Copeland's coupled Turing machines [8] provide us with another example of the untoward in uence of Turing's model on contemporary conceptions of hypercomputation. Coupled Turing machines achieve hypercomputation by relaxing yet another structural feature of the traditional Turing model. Glossing over the details, the simplest version of a coupled machine consists of a Turing machine linked to its environment by means of a single input channel. Unlike a traditional Turing machine, whose input must be inscribed on the tape in advance (before the machine starts), the input channel supplies a stream of digits to the machine's tape as it operates. To get a coupled Turing machine to compute a Turing uncomputable function, however, more is required. The input coming over the channel from the environment must have the right character. It must consist of an inÿnite sequence of binary digits d 1 ; d 2 ; : : : ; d n ; : : : that cannot be generated by the universal Turing machine. Put another way, the sequence must consist of the digits of the decimal expansion of some Turing uncomputable real number. Upon receipt of each digit, a hypercomputational coupled Turing machine performs some simple arithmetical operation such as multiplying it by 2. This results in a sequence (2xd 1 ; 2xd 2 ; : : : ; 2xd n ; : : :) that cannot be produced by the universal Turing machine. In other words, assuming that the machine does not halt, it "computes" a function f(n) = 2xd n that cannot be computed by the universal Turing machine; if it halts, the number of digits supplied by the input channel is ÿnite, and the universal machine will be able to compute the resultant function. But this is hardly surprising. The interesting work has already been done by whatever process supplied the input to the coupled machine in the ÿrst place. It is clear that the universal Turing machine cannot simulate this process.
Similar considerations apply to Turing's famous O-machines [8] , which achieve hypercomputation by means of traditional Turing machines that (unlike coupled machines) feed the arguments of uncomputable number-theoretic functions to mysterious "oracles" (proverbial black boxes), which (like the environment of a coupled machine) produce the values of these functions; the real hypercomputational work is done by the oracle [4, 5] . The point is the hypercomputational capacities of O-machines and coupled Turing machines do not derive from ÿddling with the structure of a traditional Turing machine. They derive from coupling a Turing machine to enigmatic processes, of which the most that can be said is that they are utterly unlike a Turing machine! Rather than focusing upon enriching or eliminating various structural requirements on traditional Turing machines, computer scientists would be better o focusing on how a non-Turing machine-like process could produce output of the kind required to turn a coupled Turing machine or an O-machine into a hypercomputational device.
One of the most common objections to the possibility of physical hypercomputation concerns the di culty of verifying that a physical device has computed a Turing uncomputable function. But as I have argued elsewhere [3, 5] , the veriÿcation problem is not unique to hypercomputational devices. It a icts all physical devices for computing functions. As an example, it is impossible to conclusively verify that my hand calculator computes basic arithmetical functions like addition. For my hand calculator will break down long before it ÿnishes computing a total function like addition. If I am lucky and no electronic glitches have occurred during its remarkably short life, my calculator will compute a partial function that is consistent with its computing addition. Yet this partial function is also consistent with my calculator's computing any one of an uncountably inÿnite number of other total functions that are not addition. On the other hand, I am often unlucky (particularly with cheap calculators!) since all physical devices are subject to physical perturbations that may cause them to malfunction. This underscores a frequently overlooked point. The claim that a physical machine (or, for that matter, human) computes a given function is an empirical hypothesis. Its plausibility ultimately depends upon physical considerations, both empirical and theoretical (e.g., probabilistic causal relations, counterfactual suppositions grounded in physical law), as well as mathematical considerations (e.g., identity relations among di erent arithmetical operations). Thus, for example, we have good empirical and theoretical reasons (based on the commonly accepted interpretation of quantum theory 10 ) for believing that some discrete physical processes (radioactive decay) are truly random despite the fact that the universal Turing machine can not simulate them; for this reason, radioactive processes are sometimes used in place of pseudo-random algorithms, whose outputs are not genuinely random. The upshot is that we cannot dismiss the possibility that we will someday have reasons for believing that some physical device computes a Turing uncomputable function that are just as good as the reasons that we currently have for believing that our hand calculators compute addition.
In conclusion, computer scientists are more likely to succeed in designing physical devices that actually compute Turing uncomputable functions if they focus on physics rather than on ÿddling with the structure of traditional Turing machines. For if I am right, the most promising possibilities for computing the Turing uncomputable depend upon ÿnding appropriate localized causal openings in the right sorts of physical processes. Whether such physical processes exist is of course an open question. Moreover, even supposing that they do exist, it may be technologically di cult to procedurally harness them in such a way as to reliably produce an outcome that can be unambiguously interpreted as representing a Turing uncomputable function. But none of this should be very surprising. Despite its historical connections with the formalist program in mathematics, computer science is not a branch of mathematics or logic. It is a branch of applied science.
